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EXORCISING THE GHOSTS OF BOWERS V. HARDWICK:
UPROOTING INVALID PRECEDENTS
ARTHUR S. LEONARD*
Plaintiff is not a member of a protected class. "To state a claim under 42
U.S.C. § 19831 for a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment a plaintiff must show that the defendants acted
with an intent or purpose to discriminate against the plaintiff based upon
membership in a protected class." Barren, 152 F.3d at 1194. Homosexu-
als are not a protected class in the Ninth Circuit. High Tech Gays v. De-
fense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563, 573-74 (9th Cir.
1990).2
Plaintiff's only cited "class-based" characteristic is his sexual orienta-
tion.... The Court is unaware of any authority for the proposition that
sexual orientation is a classification protected under § 1985(3) .... 3 Be-
* Professor, New York Law School. Stephen Woods, my student research assistant, provided
valuable assistance in the preparation of this paper. A faculty research grant from New York Law
School supported work on this paper during the summer of 2008.
1. The full text reads:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any
State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen
of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).
2. Sotelo v. Stewart, No. CV 03-1668-PHX-NVW, 2005 WL 2571606, at *2 (D. Ariz. Oct. 11,
2005). The pro se plaintiff, an Arizona state prison inmate described by the court as "a homosexual with
very feminine characteristics," claimed to have suffered "sexual assaults, discrimination and death
threats" by fellow prisoners but to have been denied protective custody by prison officials because of
his sexual orientation, and sought relief under the Equal Protection Clause, invoking 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Id., at * 1. The court dismissed his claim because "homosexuals are not a protected class in the Ninth
Circuit." Id, at *2. Accord Matthews v. Endel, No. 306-CV-00401-RLH-VPC, 2009 WL 44001, at *4
(D. Nev. Jan. 5, 2009) (dismissing prisoner equal protection claim, stating, "Because homosexuals are
not a protected class under the law, Matthews' equal protection claim is proper only if he can show that
Defendants' decision to send him to administrative segregation was not rationally related to a legitimate
penological interest.").
3. The full text reads:
If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire or go in disguise on the highway or
on the premises of another, for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any per-
son or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immuni-
ties under the laws; or for the purpose of preventing or hindering the constituted authorities of
any State or Territory from giving or securing to all persons within such State or Territory the
equal protection of the laws; or if two or more persons conspire to prevent by force, intimida-
tion, or threat, any citizen who is lawfully entitled to vote, from giving his support or advo-
cacy in a legal manner, toward or in favor of the election of any lawfully qualified person as
an elector for President or Vice President, or as a Member of Congress of the United States;
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cause Plaintiffs factual allegations cannot plausibly support a claim to
relief under the Constitution.... his claims against Defendant Country
Boy shall be dismissed. 4
Bowers was not correct when it was decided, and it is not correct today.
It ought not to remain binding precedent. Bowers v. Hardwick should be
and now is overruled. 5
I. THE PROBLEM: THE GHOSTS OF BOWERS v. HARD WICK
In Bowers v. Hardwick,6 the Supreme Court ruled in 1987 that the
"right of privacy" that the Court had previously identified as part of sub-
stantive due process under the Fourteenth Amendment did not shelter the
private, consensual sexual activity of gay 7 adults from prosecution under a
Georgia criminal statute, because no fundamental right was at stake and the
state legislature's inferred moral disapproval of homosexuality provided a
rational basis for the law. 8 Although the Court limited its analysis to the
Due Process Clause, many lower federal courts subsequently ruled that if
there was no constitutional protection for the sexual activities of gay peo-
ple, then governmental discrimination against gay people, a "class" defined
or to injure any citizen in person or property on account of such support or advocacy; in any
case of conspiracy set forth in this section, if one or more persons engaged therein do, or
cause to be done, any act in furtherance of the object of such conspiracy, whereby another is
injured in his person or property, or deprived of having and exercising any right or privilege
of a citizen of the United States, the party so injured or deprived may have an action for the
recovery of damages occasioned by such injury or deprivation, against any one or more of the
conspirators.
42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (2006).
4. Murray v. State of Oklahoma, No. CIV-07-1404-C 2008 WL 740338, at * 7(W.D. Okla. Mar.
17, 2008). The pro se plaintiff claimed that a store manager and the police had conspired to violate his
civil rights due to his sexual orientation, and sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The court found that the store
was a private entity, and analyzed the claim against the store under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). The court
dismissed the claim based, in part, on the conclusion that sexual orientation is not a classification
"protected" under Section 1985(3). Protection under Section 1985(3), part of the Reconstruction-era Ku
Klux Klan Act, generally applies to conspiracies to discriminate on the basis of race or other "suspect
classifications" by private actors. In another example, the Denver Post reported on September 14, 2008,
that a federal district court rejected an equal protection claim from a gay male victim of a bias assault
who was challenging the refusal of a police officer to press charges against the perpetrator, on the basis
that gay men are not a protected class under the Constitution." S. Greene, Gay Attack Swept Under the
Shrug, DENV. POST, Sept. 14, 2008, at B1. In a similar case arising in Rochester, New York, the court
confidently asserted, "Sexual Orientation is not a protected category under Section 1985." Doe v.
Green, No. 07-CV-6538L, 2009 WL 37179, at *13 (W.D.N.Y. Jan. 6,2009).
5. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
6. 478 U.S. 186(1986).
7. The word "gay" is used throughout this article to refer to men and women whose sexual
orientation is towards persons of the same sex.
8. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 196.
EXORCISING THE GHOSTS OF BOWERS V. HARDWICK
according to their sexuality, could not be unconstitutional either, whether it
was challenged under the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause
(discrimination by state or local government entities) or the Fifth Amend-
ment Due Process Clause (federal government entities).9 The result was a
number of federal circuit court decisions holding that equal protection
claims by gay litigants would merit only the least demanding rationality
review.
In 1996, however, the Supreme Court used the Equal Protection
Clause in Romer v. Evanslo to invalidate a Colorado constitutional amend-
ment that prohibited the state from redressing discrimination claims by gay
people. The Court implicitly refused to find that inferred moral disapproval
by Colorado voters could justify the measure, and explicitly found all the
arguments raised by the state to justify the provision to be implausible.
Although the Romer opinion did not explicitly address the question
whether sexual orientation is a "suspect classification,"' "I having concluded
that the challenged amendment "defied" conventional Equal Protection
analysis and was effectively a per se violation of equal protection, many
subsequent lower federal court decisions have read Romer to have held that
sexual orientation is not a suspect or quasi-suspect classification. Thus, the
Court held that the usual very deferential "rational basis" test is the appro-
priate test for challenges to government policies that discriminate against
gay people. 12 The Romer Court did not discuss Bowers, but Justice Scalia's
9. High Tech Gays v. Def. Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563 (9th Cir. 1990); Ben-
Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454 (7th Cir. 1989); Woodward v. United States, 871 F.2d 1068 (Fed. Cir.
1989); Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97 (D.C. Cir. 1987). This line of doctrine relied on both aspects of
the Bowers analysis: that no fundamental right was involved, and that legislative moral disapproval
supplies a rational basis for legislation that disadvantages people on the basis of their sexuality.
10. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
11. One of the problems in writing about this subject is the courts' inconsistent use of terminol-
ogy. The phrases "suspect class" and "protected class" as well as "suspect classification" are used by
courts at various times, but the choice among them suggests different modes of analysis. In the para-
digmatic context of discrimination based on race, can one say that white people make up a "suspect
class" or "protected class?" This is the clear implication of holdings, such as City of Richmond v. J.A.
Croson, 488 U.S. 469 (1989), that affirmative action policies preferring people of color violate Equal
Protection. If, instead, one focuses on racial classifications rather than racial groups, and contends that
racial classifications are suspect, no matter how they cut in particular cases, the Court's race discrimina-
tion jurisprudence becomes more comprehensible. The notion of a "suspect class" subverts the concept
of Equal Protection by suggesting that groups, rather than individuals, are entitled to equal protection of
the law. But that is not what the Fourteenth Amendment says. The idea of "suspect classification" is
consistent with the concept of Equal Protection, by suggesting that every person is entitled not to suffer
discrimination based on the particular characteristic that defines the classification implicitly or explic-
itly created by the government policy at issue.
12. Cook v. Gates, 528 F.3d 42, 61 (1st Cir. 2008) (citing Scarbrough v. Morgan County Bd. of
Ed., 470 F.3d 250, 261 (6th Cir. 2006)); Citizens for Equal Prot. v. Bruning, 455 F.3d 859, 866 (8th Cir.
2006); Johnson v. Johnson, 385 F.3d 503, 532 (5th Cir. 2004); Lofton v. Sec'y of the Dep't of Children
& Family Serv., 358 F.3d 804, 818 (1 1th Cir. 2004); Veney v. Wyche, 293 F.3d 726, 731-32 (4th Cir.
2002); Holmes v. Cal. Army Nat'l Guard, 124 F.3d 1126, 1132 (9th Cir. 1997).
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dissent, citing lower court equal protection rulings, argued that the Court's
holding was inconsistent with Bowers, an assertion to which the majority of
the Court made no rejoinder. 13 The Court's failure to employ the usual
vocabulary of equal protection analysis in Romer led lower federal courts
to continue on their Bowers-influenced path for the most part, continuing to
cite pre-Romer circuit court rulings as precedent in gay equal protection
cases.
In 2003, the Supreme Court explicitly overruled Bowers in Law-
rence v. Texas,14 in which the Court held that the private, consensual sexual
activity of gay adults came within the sphere of liberty protected by the
Due Process Clause, and that the Texas Homosexual Conduct Law "fur-
thers no legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion into the per-
sonal and private life of the individual."' 5 The Court asserted that Bowers
was wrong when it was decided, immediately casting doubt on the validity
of lower federal court decisions that had relied upon Bowers from 1987
onwards to analyze Equal Protection claims brought by gay litigants.And yet, those pre-Lawrence (and, indeed, pre-Romer) court of ap-
peals decisions have a ghostly afterlife. These cases, and cases relying on
their reasoning, are still cited by some courts to justify rejecting gay equal
protection claims on the ground that "homosexuals" are not a "protected
class," amidst assertions that Bowers was not "completely" overruled in
Lawrence,16 or that the Court's focus on the Due Process Clause in Law-
rence rendered its decision irrelevant to subsequent Equal Protection analy-
sis, 17 leaving the pre-Lawrence court of appeals decisions standing as
binding circuit precedents. In 2008, for example, the Court of Appeals for
the Tenth Circuit ruled that until Lawrence was decided, a government
actor could claim qualified immunity from constitutional liability for anti-
gay discrimination, and the panel was unwilling to take a position on
whether such immunity would still pertain in cases that arose after Law-
13. Romer, 517 U.S. at 640.
14. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
15. Id. at 578.
16. Id. at 586 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The "logic" of this, in the face of Lawrence's declaration that
Bowers was "not correct" when it was decided, might be that because the Lawrence court did not
explicitly hold that gay people have a "fundamental right" to engage in sodomy, and did not explicitly
state that it was using heightened or strict scrutiny to strike down the statute, the practical doctrinal
holding of Bowers-that the statute was to be evaluated using the rational basis test-was intact, and
the Court had merely rejected that portion of Bowers holding that the Georgia legislature's moral
disapproval of sodomy could be a rational basis for the statute. Lower courts were apparently not
persuaded by the expansive rhetoric of Justice Kennedy's opinion for the Court, since Justice Scalia
assured them in his dissenting dictum that the Court had not declared "homosexual sodomy" to be a
"fundamental right." Id.
17. Id. at 575.
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rence was decided. 18
This article proposes that these "ghosts" of the overruled Bowers
decision should be exorcized and uprooted from American constitutional
law by giving respectful treatment to Romer and Lawrence as the signal
Supreme Court decisions on the constitutional rights of gay people and by
interpreting those decisions in a manner consistent with the reasoning and
holding of the Court's opinions; we should not be limited by dicta emanat-
ing from Justice Scalia's dissents in both cases, which incorrectly charac-
terize the true import of the decisions. 19
This article describes the development of this post-Bowers anti-gay
equal protection jurisprudence up to the time of Lawrence v. Texas, re-
counts the lingering effects of the pre-Lawrence case law, identifies the
"ghosts" of Bowers, and argues that they should be laid to rest once and for
all. 20
II. ANTI-GAY DISCRIMINATION IN THE COURTS FROM BOWERS TO
LA WRENCE
The U.S. Supreme Court ruled in 2003 in Lawrence v. Texas21 that
states could not impose criminal penalties on an adult who engaged in pri-
vate, consensual sexual activity with another person of the same sex. The
petitioners in Lawrence were convicted in a Texas trial court of engaging in
private, consensual conduct that violated the Texas Homosexual Conduct
18. Milligan-Hitt v. Bd. of Tr. of Sheridan County Sch. Dist. No. 2, 523 F.3d 1219 (10th Cir.
2008). Government actors enjoy qualified immunity from liability if their actions do not violate a
constitutional right that was well established by Supreme Court or binding court of appeals precedents
at the time of their action. A few weeks after Milligan-Hitt was decided, a different Tenth Circuit panel
rejected a qualified immunity claim in a gay equal protection case arising from facts post-dating Law-
rence, however. Price-Comelison v. Brooks, 524 F.3d 1103 (10th Cir. 2008).
19. Some lower courts have cited Justice Scalia's dissents as a source for discerning the meaning
of the majority opinions, and some have even opined that the failure of the Court to expressly contradict
Scalia's dissenting statements implies that they are correct characterizations of the Court's holdings.
See, e.g., Sylvester v. Fogley, 465 F.3d 851, 858 (8th Cir. 2006); Cook v. Rumsfeld, 429 F.Supp.2d
385, 394 (D. Mass. 2006), aff'd on other grounds sub nom. Cook v. Gates, 528 F.3d 42 (1st Cir. 2008);
Lofton v. Sec'y of the Dep't of Children & Family Serv., 358 F.3d 804, 816 (1 th Cir. 2004).
20. After I had conceived and drafted much of this article, the Connecticut Supreme Court pointed
out in its same-sex marriage ruling that federal equal protection cases that had rejected heightened
scrutiny of sexual orientation discrimination claims were of little persuasive value due to their contin-
ued reliance on old precedents rooted in Bowers, stating:
To a very substantial degree, Lawrence undermines the validity of the federal circuit court
cases that have held that gay persons are not entitled to heightened judicial protection be-
cause, as we have explained, the courts in those cases relied heavily-and in some cases ex-
clusively-on Bowers to support their conclusions.
Kerrigan v. Comm'n of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 467 (Conn. 2008).
21. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 558.
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Law,22 which made it a misdemeanor for same-sex couples to engage in
anal or oral sex, regardless of the age of the actors or whether the conduct
was private or public, consensual or non-consensual. 23 The Supreme Court
held that the charged conduct came within the sphere of liberty protected
under the Due Process clause, and that "[t]he Texas statute furthers no le-
gitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion into the personal and
private life of the individual. '24 The Court declined to rule on an alternative
Equal Protection challenge to the statute, on which it had also granted cer-
tiorari,25 although it acknowledged that a "tenable argument" based on
Equal Protection could be made.26 Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, concur-
ring in the result, based her analysis solely on Equal Protection. 27
On the way to reaching its decision, the Court responded to the third
question on which it had granted certiorari, 28 overruling Bowers v. Hard-
wick,29 in which it had held in 1986 that a Georgia law 30 making all oral or
anal sex subject to felony prosecution did not violate the Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process rights of "homosexuals."'3 1 After his arrest on
consensual sodomy charges, Michael Hardwick sued to have the statute
declared unconstitutional as a violation of the constitutional right of pri-
vacy, which had been described by the Supreme Court in prior cases con-
22. TEXAS PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.06(a) (Vernon 2003).
23. Id.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
24. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
25. Id. at 564.
26. Id. at 574-75.
27. Id. at 579-85 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor suggested that "more searching"
scrutiny would apply in cases where a challenged policy "inhibits personal relationships," citing older
Equal Protection cases such as Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985), Depart-
ment of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973), and Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972). Id.
at 580. While she had joined the Court's decision in Bowers, believing that legislators could express
moral disapproval of homosexuality through criminal law without violating the Due Process Clause, she
was unwilling to countenance moral disapproval as justification to forbid some individuals from engag-
ing in conduct that was allowed to others.
28. The Court's grant of certiorari listed three questions: (1) whether the statute violated the Due
Process Clause, (2) whether it violated the Equal Protection Clause; and (3) whether Bowers v. Hard-
wick should be overruled. 539 U.S. at 564.
29. 478 U.S. 186. Actually, the Court did more than merely overrule Bowers. It stated: "Bowers
was not correct when it was decided, and it is not correct today. It ought not to remain binding prece-
dent. Bowers v. Hardwick should be and now is overruled." 539 U.S. at 578. The way in which the
Court overruled Bowers suggests that all subsequent lower court decisions that relied on Bowers as
precedent must themselves be viewed as being of questionable significance as precedents.
30. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2.
31. Writing for the Court in Bowers, Justice Byron White framed the question presented to the
Court as follows: "The issue presented is whether the Federal Constitution confers a fundamental right
upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy and hence invalidates the laws of the many States that still
make such conduct illegal and have done so for a very long time." Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190.
524 [Vol 84:2
EXORCISING THE GHOSTS OF BOWERS V. HARDWICK
cerning reproductive freedom. 32 A different-sex couple joined as co-
plaintiffs, but the district court found that they did not have standing to
challenge the statute, even though it potentially applied to their conduct, as
they had never been arrested and the state showed no inclination to attempt
to enforce the statute against consenting different-sex adult couples.33 The
district court dismissed Michael Hardwick's claim, relying on the Supreme
Court's earlier summary affirmance of a three-judge district court ruling
that had rejected a similar constitutional challenge to the Virginia sodomy
law a decade earlier.34 A divided Eleventh Circuit panel reversed,35 finding
that subsequent Supreme Court rulings had undermined whatever prece-
dential weight the summary affirmance had, and found that the state should
have to prove a compelling interest because the privacy right to sexual
intimacy claimed by Hardwick was "fundamental. '36 The state successfully
petitioned for certiorari, and the Supreme Court ruled, by a vote of five to
four, that the Constitution did not confer upon homosexuals a "fundamental
right" to engage in sodomy, characterizing the claim as "facetious" in light
of the long history of criminal treatment of "homosexual sodomy. '37 Be-
cause the Court did not deem the claimed right to be "fundamental," the
statute was evaluated for its "rationality." The state prevailed based on the
Court's inference that the statute reflected moral disapproval of homosex-
ual sodomy by Georgia legislators and the Court's judgment that such
moral disapproval provided a rational basis for the prohibition.38 In a foot-
note at the end of the opinion, the Court stated, "Respondent does not de-
32. Hardwick v. Bowers, 760 F.2d 1202, 1211 (11 th Cir. 1985) (citing Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405
U.S. 438 (1972); Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479 (1965)).
33. Hardwick, 760 F.2d at 1206-07; Bowers, 478 U.S. at 188 n.2. In the oral argument before the
Supreme Court, counsel for the state conceded that enforcing the statute against such couples would
violate the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 218 n. 10 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
34. Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney for the City of Richmond, 425 U.S. 901 (1976), aff'g, 403
F.Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va.1975).
35. Hardwick, 760 F.2d 1202.
36. Specifically, the court stated, "The Georgia sodomy statute infringes upon the fundamental
constitutional rights of Michael Hardwick. On remand, the State must demonstrate a compelling interest
in restricting this right and must show that the sodomy statute is a properly restrained method of safe-
guarding its interests." Id. at 1211.
37. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 194 n.2.
38. Id. at 196. Since the statute itself did not single out homosexual sodomy but instead made all
anal or oral sex a crime, regardless of the genders of the participants, the logical basis of the Court's
inference that the legislature was acting out of moral disapproval of homosexuality rather than moral
disapproval of anal or oral sex, was questionable. Given the historical derivation and context of sodomy
laws, the legislators were more likely acting out of religious sentiments, as reflected in the Biblical
citation found in Chief Justice Warren Burger's concurring opinion tracing sodomy laws to "Judeao-
Christian moral and ethical standards," id. at 197, but the Court was not about to strike down the statute
as an establishment of religion in violation of the First Amendment, an argument not advanced by
Hardwick.
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fend the judgment below based on the Ninth Amendment, the Equal Pro-
tection Clause, or the Eighth Amendment," 39 and the majority opinion did
not address the question whether the application of the Georgia sodomy
law to Hardwick might violate his right to equal protection of the laws.40
Lower federal courts quickly fixed on Bowers (sometimes referred to
in their opinions as Hardwick) as a precedent for rejecting Equal Protection
claims by gay litigants, in many cases without bothering to discuss the
factors that the Supreme Court has mentioned when it has analyzed the
standard of review to apply in earlier Equal Protection cases that concerned
discrimination based on other characteristics. Instead, the courts suggested
that the ruling in Bowers precluded finding that homosexuals enjoyed
class-based protection.
In one of its leading equal protection cases prior to Bowers, City of
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center,41 the Court reviewed various factors
deemed relevant to this determination, in a nuanced manner that suggested
that the characteristics that had commanded strict or heightened scrutiny
were afforded that level of review for particularistic reasons, and not based
on satisfying all the elements of some standardized checklist. The Court
first mentioned race, alienage, and national origin, which it characterized as
characteristics "so seldom relevant to the achievement of any legitimate
state interest that laws grounded in such considerations are deemed to re-
flect prejudice and antipathy-a view that those in the burdened class are
not as worthy or deserving as others," and emphasized that "such discrimi-
nation is unlikely to be soon rectified by legislative means," so those disad-
vantaged by discriminatory government policies needed the assistance of
the courts to vindicate their equality rights.42 Then the Court mentioned
gender classifications, which had been given "heightened scrutiny" by the
Court because, in its view, gender "generally provides no sensible ground
for differential treatment," and its use "very likely reflect[s] outmoded
notions of the relative capabilities of men and women. '43 Similarly, "ille-
gitimacy," said the Court, "is beyond the individual's control and bears 'no
relation to the individual's ability to participate in and contribute to soci-
ety." '44 The Court explained that age classifications had not been subjected
to heightened scrutiny because there was no "history of purposeful unequal
39. Id. at 196 n.8.
40. Both dissenters suggested that the statute was vulnerable to an equal protection challenge. See
id. at 202 n.2 (Blackmun, J., dissenting), 218-20 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
41. 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
42. Id. at 440.
43. Id. at440-41.
44. Id. at 441 (quoting Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 505 (1976)).
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treatment" or evidence that age classifications were based on "stereotyped
characteristics not truly indicative" of the abilities of older people.45 In
ruling against the claim that mental disability was a characteristic that
should receive heightened scrutiny, the Court emphasized that people with
such a characteristic are not as capable of functioning in the world, and also
pointed out that legislation concerning them is as often protective as exclu-
sionary.46
Thus, it appears from Cleburne that the factors the Court would con-
sider significant in evaluating characteristics to determine the level of scru-
tiny in an equal protection challenge would vary depending upon the
characteristic, but might include whether the characteristic is relevant to a
person's ability to participate in society, whether it is essentially beyond
the control of the individual, whether there is a history of purposeful dis-
crimination, whether the disadvantaged group was capable of defending its
interests in the legislative process, and whether the use of the classification
reflects inaccurate stereotypes, but it does not appear that a group defined
by a characteristic needs a "perfect score" on a checklist involving all or
even most of these considerations to merit heightened scrutiny. This proc-
ess of focusing on the particular factors that are relevant to a particular
characteristic is sensible, in light of the purpose for which the analysis is
undertaken, which is to determine whether there is some reason to suspect
that the legislature or regulator or administrator has acted with discrimina-
tory intent. If we have no particular reason to suspect discriminatory intent
when a particular characteristic is used to determine whether a particular
individual is qualified to participate in some activity or enjoy some benefit,
then it seems appropriate to place the burden on the complaining individual
to prove discriminatory intent, and no presumption of such intent should
attach to the government action. But when the government premises enti-
tlements or prohibitions on characteristics whose nature and history would
suggest the likelihood of discriminatory intent, the government should have
to justify itself by presenting a non-discriminatory reason for its actions.
That's what "suspect classification" analysis is all about. And, clearly, a
"perfect score" on a checklist of factors that the Court has considered
would leave out many classifications as to which suspicions of discrimina-
tory intent would be appropriate.
To take obvious examples, race continues to be considered a suspect
classification for equal protection purposes, to judge by recent affirmative
45. Id. (quoting Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976)).
46. Id. at 446.
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action decisions, 47 even though it is clear that racial minorities have at-
tained sufficient political influence and support from others in the legisla-
tive process to achieve the enactment of laws banning race discrimination
nationally and in virtually all the states, because racial stereotypes remain a
serious problem in our society.48 Sex is considered a quasi-suspect classifi-
cation, even though women make up a majority of the electorate and serve
in high government offices, and even though federal, state and local laws
explicitly forbid a wide range of discriminatory activity based on sex, be-
cause women remain subject to stereotyped thinking. 49 The key is that a
realistic assessment of the process of public policy making in the United
States must acknowledge that the use of race or sex as a criterion for gov-
ernment prohibitions or entitlements continues to raise suspicions about
discriminatory intent, sufficient to require the government, when chal-
lenged, to justify its policy. This approach has been largely lacking in gay
equal protection cases, due to the lingering effect of the ghosts of Bowers v.
Hardwick.
Almost exactly one year after Bowers, in 1987, the D.C. Circuit in-
voked Bowers in ruling against a claim that the Federal Bureau of Investi-
gation's categorical rejection of employment applications from gay people
should be subjected to heightened scrutiny.50 In refusing to consider Mar-
garet Padula, a highly qualified lesbian applicant, the Bureau maintained
that it was concerned with conduct, not status, so that if there was some
"class" of individuals disadvantaged by its policy, it was a class defined by
conduct. "It would be quite anomalous, on its face, to declare status defined
by conduct that states may constitutionally criminalize as deserving of
strict scrutiny under the equal protection clause," wrote the court in reject-
ing the equal protection claim. 51 "If the [Supreme] Court was unwilling to
object to state laws that criminalize the behavior that defines the class, it is
hardly open to a lower court to conclude that state sponsored discrimination
against the class is invidious. After all, there can hardly be more palpable
discrimination against a class than making the conduct that defines the
47. See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2751
(2007); Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 535 (2005); Rothe Dev. Corp. v. Dep't of Def., 545 F.3d
1023, 1030 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
48. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2006).
49. Id.
50. Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97, 102-03 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
51. Id. at 103. The D.C. Circuit had previously put off deciding the "difficult issue" whether
government discrimination based on sexual orientation was unconstitutional in Doe v. Casey, 796 F.2d
1508, 1522 (D.C. Cir. 1986), decided shortly after Bowers, observing that Bowers had not addressed
that question and that the factual posture in which the case came to the court for review did not clearly
present the issue.
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class criminal," the court continued. 52 The court did not mention or analyze
the various criteria that the Supreme Court had considered in the past in
determining whether a particular classification should be considered "sus-
pect," meriting strict or heightened scrutiny of challenged legislation. Con-
sequently, the court applied rationality review, and decided that it was
rational for the Bureau, a national law enforcement agency, to reject appli-
cants whose preferred form of sexual expression was theoretically illegal in
half of the states, reasoning, inter alia, that the Bureau could fear that its
agents, privy to confidential information of national security importance,
could be vulnerable to blackmail. 53
Next on board with this analysis was the Federal Circuit, considering a
claim by a gay man who had been dismissed from the Navy because of his
sexuality. 54 The court characterized the impact of Bowers on James
Woodward's equal protection claim as "persuasive, if not dispositive. ' 55
The court explained:
After Hardwick it cannot logically be asserted that discrimination
against homosexuals is constitutionally infirm. We agree with the court
in Padula v. Webster that "there can hardly be more palpable discrimina-
tion against a class than making the conduct that defines the class crimi-
nal."
Accordingly, we conclude that Woodward is not a member of a
class to which heightened scrutiny must be afforded nor that the Navy
must have a compelling interest to justify discrimination against Wood-
ward because of his admitted homosexuality. 56
The court also purported to distinguish Woodward's claim from other
types of equal protection claims by characterizing homosexuality as "be-
havioral" in nature, as distinguished from race or alienage,57 even though
Woodward had not been discharged for engaging in any prohibited con-
duct.
52. Padula, 822 F.2d at 103.
53. Id. at 104. In 1994 the D.C. Circuit reiterated this view en banc in Steffan v. Perry, stating,
We dismiss Steffan's oblique suggestion, made only in a sketchy footnote and apparently
abandoned during oral argument, that heightened scrutiny should be applied because homo-
sexuals constitute a "suspect class" under the Supreme Court's test for identifying such
classes. As we explained in Padula, if the government can criminalize homosexual conduct, a
class that is defined by reference to that conduct cannot constitute a "suspect class." Indeed,
Steffan as much as concedes the point by agreeing that the military can ban those who engage
in homosexual conduct.
41 F.3d 677, 684 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (en banc) (citations omitted).
54. Woodward v. United States, 871 F.2d 1068 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
55. Id. at 1075.
56. Id. at 1076 (citation omitted). The court then held that the policy was a rational means for the
Navy to maintain "good order and morale," quoting from Naval regulations supporting the policy of
requiring the dismissal of service members found to be gay that was then in effect. Id.
57. Id.
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The Seventh Circuit soon employed a variation on the same reasoning
in another military case. 58 The trial court had ruled that the policy under
which Miriam Ben-Shalom was dismissed from the Army was unconstitu-
tional, rejecting the Army's argument that its policy focused on conduct
rather than status and finding no justification for treating gay people, a
group considered to be defined by reference to a "suspect" or "quasi-
suspect" classification by the trial court, differently from others who en-
gaged in the same conduct. Even alternatively applying the deferential
version of rationality review that federal courts normally employ in evalu-
ating constitutional challenges to military regulations, the trial judge found
the policy unconstitutional as lacking any rational justification. 59 The Army
appealed, contending that the trial court had misconstrued its regulations as
being class-based and had been inadequately deferential, while Ben-
Shalom argued that heightened or strict scrutiny, as found by the trial court,
would be the appropriate method of analysis. The court of appeals rejected
her argument:
Although the [Supreme] Court analyzed the constitutionality of the stat-
ute on a due process rather than an equal protection basis, Hardwick
nevertheless impacts on the scrutiny aspects under an equal protection
analysis. The majority held that the Constitution confers no fundamental
right upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy. If homosexual conduct
may constitutionally be criminalized, then homosexuals do not constitute
a suspect or quasi-suspect class entitled to greater than rational basis
scrutiny for equal protection purposes. The Constitution, in light of
Hardwick, cannot otherwise be rationally applied, lest an unjustified and
indefensible inconsistency result.6 0
The court did not explain what the "unjustified and indefensible in-
consistency" might be.
The Ninth Circuit soon articulated the same rationale in rejecting an
equal protection challenge to the Department of Defense's method of
evaluating security clearance applications from gay employees or potential
58. Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454 (7th Cir. 1989).
59. Id. at 458.
60. Id. at 464-65. The court went on to find that under deferential rational basis review, the
Army's policy was constitutional, and specifically stated its agreement with the D.C. Circuit's reason-
ing in Padula v. Webster: "We... find no fault with Padula and believe its equal protection reasoning
to be as applicable to the Army as to the FBI." Id. at 465. The court also rejected the trial court's focus
on status, stating that the military policy was phrased in terms of conduct, and that the plaintiff had
admitted to being a lesbian, and thus having a desire or propensity to engage in the kind of conduct that
the Supreme Court had determined in Bowers to have no constitutional protection. The court did not
analyze the factors that the Supreme Court has normally discussed when it considers whether a particu-
lar classification is "suspect," apart from acknowledging that homosexuals had faced a history of dis-
crimination. The court also failed to apprehend that the Supreme Court's historical references in
Hardwick were totally inapposite to women's same-sex conduct, since the historical crime of sodomy
could only be accomplished if one of the participants possessed a penis.
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employees of federal government defense contractors. 61 "If for federal
analysis we must reach equal protection of the Fourteenth Amendment by
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment," wrote the court in High
Tech Gays v. Defense Industrial Security Clearance Office:
[A]nd if there is no fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy
under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, it would be in-
congruous to expand the reach of equal protection to find a fundamental
right of homosexual conduct under the equal protection component of
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 62
The court stated its disagreement with the conclusion of a prior Ninth Cir-
cuit panel that Bowers had no relevance to analyzing a gay litigant's equal
protection claim.63
However, subsequent to High Tech Gays, a different panel of the
Ninth Circuit, considering a direct challenge to the military policy against
service by gay people in Pruitt v. Cheney,64 characterized High Tech Gays
as having applied "active rational basis" review rather than the traditional
highly deferential rationality standard of review, even though High Tech
Gays never uses that term and the decision explicitly disavows providing
constitutional protection against discrimination to gay people. Presumably,
the Pruitt court based its characterization on High Tech Gays' citation of
Cleburne, a rare case in which the Supreme Court struck down a statute on
Equal Protection grounds even though it found that the classification at
issue was not suspect or quasi-suspect, leading commentators to describe
61. High Tech Gays v. Def. Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563, 573-74 (9th Cir. 1990).
To be fair, the Ninth Circuit opinion also discussed various factors that courts have analyzed to deter-
mine whether a particular classification should be considered "suspect" for equal protection purposes as
an alternative basis for denying the claim for heightened scrutiny of the government policy. It decided
that homosexuality was not an "immutable characteristic" and that legislatures had begun to show
enough regard for gay rights to reject the claims that gay people were politically powerless. Id. This
latter point could only cause astonishment to an objective observer in 1990, when progress towards
political and legal equality for gay people was at a very early stage, and had yet to achieve any express
protection under federal law or the laws of the overwhelming majority of states. Indeed, at the time, gay
people were expressly excluded from various kinds of federal employment, and were deemed exclud-
able from entry in to the United States as "sexual perverts" under the immigration laws. Some power!
In a challenge to a federal policy, one would assume that the political effectiveness of the group at the
federal level would be the relevant inquiry.
62. Id. at 571 (citations omitted). The court cited to Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954),
holding that equal protection claims against the federal government are cognizable under the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, and Bowers. The court went on to find that the Defense De-
partment had a rational basis for subjecting gay security clearance applicants to greater scrutiny than
other applicants, citing the same fears about blackmail of individuals with access to confidential na-
tional security information that had been relied upon by the Padula court. Ironically, the court explicitly
relied on then-recent Congressional hearing testimony about subversion of male American diplomatic
staff at the Embassy in Moscow, who were targeted for seduction by female Russian agents. 895 F.2d at
575-78.
63. 895 F.2d at 573 n.9.
64. 963 F.2d 1160 (9th Cir. 1991).
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what the Court was doing in that case as "active rational basis" review to
distinguish it from the normally deferential type of rationality review. But
the High Tech Gays court did not strike down the contested Defense De-
partment procedures, and accepted a stereotypically-based rationale to up-
hold them, suggesting that the Pruitt panel's characterization of High Tech
Gays was off the mark. Surely, it would have surprised the judges who
served on the High Tech Gays panel, especially when applied in a military
service case where judicial deference to professional military judgment is
the norm. 65
Subsequently, the Tenth Circuit ruled in Jantz v. Muci that in light of
Bowers and the "confusion in the law" that it spawned concerning equal
protection claims by gay litigants, a school superintendent would enjoy
qualified immunity from a claim that he had refused to hire an applicant to
be the principal of a high school because of the applicant's perceived ho-
mosexual tendencies. 66 "Plaintiff argues that Hardwick is inapposite be-
cause it dealt with a substantive due process analysis whereas his claim is
based on the equal protection clause," wrote the court, continuing:
For purposes of qualified immunity, however, we need not decide how
Hardwick affects equal protection claims; we need only note that courts
have reached differing conclusions on the issue.
Plaintiff argues that, even though the cases interpreting Hardwick
have reached differing results on the level of scrutiny applied to classifi-
cations based on homosexual conduct or status, each court applied at
least the minimal rational basis test of Moreno and Cleburne. We agree,
and prior to Hardwick we twice applied rational basis review to classifi-
cations which disparately affected homosexuals. The Supreme Court,
however, held in Hardwick that the community's notions of morality
were sufficient to provide a rational basis for the statute. Although the
Hardwick Court did not deal with an equal protection claim, for qualified
immunity purposes we think its holding, and the general state of confu-
sion in the law at the time, cast enough shadow on the area so that any
65. In a much later case, Flores v. Morgan Hill Unified Sch. Dist., 324 F.3d 1130 (9th Cir. 2003),
yet another panel of the Ninth Circuit cited High Tech Gays as crucial to rejecting a qualified immunity
claim in a sexual orientation discrimination case arising in the public school context during the 1990s.
"The plaintiffs are members of an identifiable class for equal protection purposes because they allege
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation," wrote the court, id. at 1134-35 (citing High Tech
Gays, 895 F.2d 563, 570-71), and in a parenthetical, characterized High Tech Gays as "finding that
homosexuals are not a suspect or quasi-suspect class, but are a definable group entitled to rational basis
scrutiny for equal protection purposes." Id. at 1137.
66. Jantz v. Muci, 976 F.2d 623, 630 (10th Cir. 1992). A government official whose performance
of a discretionary act is challenged on constitutional grounds enjoys "qualified immunity" from the
claim unless her conduct violates "clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). According to
the Tenth Circuit in Jantz, this means that "the plaintiff must demonstrate that the unlawfulness of the
conduct was 'apparent' in the light of pre-existing law." 976 F.2d at 627 (quoting Anderson v. Creigh-
ton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)).
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unlawfulness in Defendant's actions was not "apparent" in 1988....
Therefore, we hold that Defendant is entitled to qualified immunity.67
The Sixth Circuit was the next to weigh in, considering the City of
Cincinnati's appeal from a trial court decision invalidating a charter
amendment recently adopted by voter initiative, repealing the city's ban on
sexual orientation discrimination by prohibiting the city from adopting such
a ban.68 Plaintiff Equality Foundation argued, among other things, that the
charter amendment violated equal protection of the laws. The trial judge
had decided that sexual orientation is a "quasi-suspect classification,"
based on his conclusion that it is an immutable characteristic, and he had
dismissed the relevance of Bowers to this determination, going on to de-
clare the charter amendment unconstitutional in the face of heightened
scrutiny.69 Reversing, a Sixth Circuit panel ruled that sexual orientation, for
all practical purposes of public anti-discrimination policy, was a status
determined and identified by behavior, thus making the lack of constitu-
tional protection for such behavior determinative. "Since Bowers," wrote
the court, "every circuit court which has addressed the issue has decreed
that homosexuals are entitled to no special constitutional protection, as
either a suspect or a quasi-suspect class, because the conduct which places
them in that class is not constitutionally protected." 70 The court continued:
Those persons who fall within the orbit of legislation concerning
sexual orientation are so affected not because of their orientation but
rather by their conduct which identifies them as homosexual, bisexual, or
heterosexual. Indeed, from the testimony developed by the record (in-
cluding that of the plaintiffs' expert psychologist, Dr. John Gonsiorek,
who attested that most people either engage in sexual behavior which is
consistent with their sexual orientation or engage in no sexual activity at
all), this court concludes that, for purposes of these proceedings, it is vir-
tually impossible to distinguish or separate individuals of a particular
orientation which predisposes them toward a particular sexual conduct
from those who actually engage in that particular type of sexual con-
duct. 7 1
Therefore, Bowers v. Hardwick and its progeny command that, as a
matter of law, gays, lesbians, and bisexuals cannot constitute either a
"suspect class" or a "quasi-suspect class," and, accordingly, the district
67. 976 U.S. at 629-30.
68. Equal. Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 54 F.3d 261 (6th Cir. 1995).
The charter amendment at issue was, with minor variations, identical to the text of Colorado Amend-
ment 2, enacted on the same election day and subsequently invalidated on Equal Protection grounds in
Romer.
69. Equal. Found. v. City of Cincinnati, 860 F.Supp. 417 (S.D. Ohio 1994).
70. 54 F.3d at 266.
71. Id. at 267.
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court's application of the intermediate heightened scrutiny standard to
the constitutional analysis of the Amendment was erroneous. 72
Thus, by the time the Supreme Court came to decide Romer in 1996,
numerous circuit courts of appeals had rejected equal protection claims by
gay litigants based at least in part on the reasoning that by denying consti-
tutional protection to "homosexuals" who engage in "sodomy" under the
Due Process Clause in Bowers, the Supreme Court had precluded gay peo-
ple, a category the lower courts saw as being defined by particular conduct
in which some gay people engage, 73 from obtaining protection from dis-
crimination using an equal protection argument, since moral disapproval of
homosexuality would always suffice as a rational justification for disfa-
vored treatment of homosexuals.
In Romer, the Court confronted directly whether a state policy that
specifically discriminated based on the "homosexual status" or "conduct"
of individuals violated the Equal Protection Clause. Colorado voters had
added Amendment 2 to their state constitution in 1992. Amendment 2
specified that neither the state nor any of its subdivisions could adopt any
policy that would protect gay people from discrimination or treat gay peo-
ple as a "protected class" for purposes of state law. 74 After briefly describ-
ing its normal mode of analyzing Equal Protection claims-"if a law
neither burdens a fundamental right nor targets a suspect class, we will
uphold the legislative classification so long as it bears a rational relation to
some legitimate end" 75-the Court stated, "Amendment 2 fails, indeed
defies, even this conventional inquiry." 76 And the Court did not bother to
describe the "conventional inquiry" any further. That is, it did not discuss
whether sexual orientation should be considered a "suspect classification"
or whether gay people should be considered a "suspect class," or whether it
72. Id. at 268.
73. The courts routinely conflate "homosexual conduct" with "sodomy," even though there was
no evidence in any of these cases that all gay people necessarily engaged in the specific conduct that the
Court had found unprotected in Bowers. The Bowers Court was dealing with the constitutionality of a
specific statute that applied only to specified sexual acts, not broadly to all same-sex conduct of a
sexual nature, and thus would not have covered some of the conduct that the Sixth Circuit might see as
relevant to determining whether somebody is a member of the conduct-defined "class."
74. The full text states:
Neither the State of Colorado, through any of its branches or departments, nor any of its
agencies, political subdivisions, municipalities or school districts, shall enact, adopt or en-
force any statute, regulation, ordinance or policy whereby homosexual, lesbian or bisexual
orientation, conduct, practices or relationships shall constitute or otherwise be the basis of or
entitle any person or class of persons to have or claim any minority status, quota preferences,
protected status or claim of discrimination. This Section of the Constitution shall be in all re-
spects self-executing.
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 624 (1996) (quoting the COLO. CONST. art. 11, § 30b(1992)).
75. 517U.S.at631.
76. Id. at 632.
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was appropriate to subject Amendment 2 to "strict scrutiny" or "heightened
scrutiny," even though these would at the time be considered questions of
first impression for the Supreme Court, which had never previously de-
cided a gay plaintiffs Equal Protection claim on the merits. Adhering sub
silentio to the practice of avoiding deciding constitutional issues whose
resolution is unnecessary to the case, the Court instead explained why
Amendment 2 failed to survive rationality review.
The Court explained that Amendment 2 failed the "rational relation to
some legitimate end" criterion for two reasons. First, it imposed "a broad
and undifferentiated disability on a single named group," and, second, "its
sheer breadth is so discontinuous with the reasons offered for it that the
amendment seems inexplicable by anything but animus toward the class it
affects." 77 In other words, the Court concluded that the only plausible ex-
planation for the enactment of a sweeping denial of any protection whatso-
ever for people because of their gay identity or conduct was animus against
gay people. If this was the explanation for the provision, it could not stand
under the Court's existing precedents, which had ruled out disparate treat-
ment due to official animus against a group on the ground that bare animus,
as such, is not a legitimate justification for differential treatment.78 The
Court succinctly reviewed various arguments that had been made in sup-
port of Amendment 2 and found them implausible in light of the broad
sweep of the provision.79
Thus, Romer's precedential holding is that animus against gay people,
presumably founded on some sort of moral disapproval of homosexuality
of the type described by the Court in Bowers, will not suffice to sustain a
state policy that explicitly virtually excludes gay people from the struggles
of ordinary politics by disempowering the political branches of government
from adopting any policies to protect them from discrimination. This means
that a state policy that treats people adversely due to their sexual orienta-
tion requires at least some sort of non-discriminatory, non-moralistic justi-
fication in order to be found constitutional, and that a plaintiffs assertion
that he or she has been subjected to discrimination on the basis of sexual
77. Id.
78. See, for example, U.S. Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, the case cited by the Court on
this point. 413 U.S. 528 (1973). In Moreno, the Court struck down a provision of the federal food stamp
program that disqualified individuals residing in households with other adults to whom they were not
legally related or married. According to its legislative history, the provision had been adopted specifi-
cally to prevent "hippie communes" from qualifying for food stamps. The Court held that moral disap-
proval of "hippie communes" could not be a legitimate purpose for a provision that directly undercut
the two avowed overall purposes of the statute: alleviating hunger and subsidizing American agriculture
by increasing demand for its products. Id. at 533-35.
79. Romer, 517 U.S. at 626, 635.
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orientation cannot simply be dismissed based on the assertion that "homo-
sexuals are not a protected class." Amendment 2 provided that gay people
would not constitute a "protected class" for any purpose or in any context
in Colorado and the Supreme Court found that assertion to be unconstitu-
tional on its face, commenting that the state could not treat any of its citi-
zens as "stranger[s] to its laws."' 80
In the first Equal Protection decision involving a gay plaintiff to be
announced after Romer, Nabozny v. Podlesny,81 the Seventh Circuit could
not apply Romer directly, because the events underlying the case had oc-
curred before Romer was decided. The court had to determine whether
public school officials enjoyed qualified immunity against an equal protec-
tion claim brought by a gay male former high school student, who asserted
that school officials did not take action to protect him against sexually-
charged attacks by fellow male students in the same way that they had de-
monstrably taken action to protect female students against similar attacks
by male students. The claim could be characterized as both a sex discrimi-
nation claim and a sexual orientation discrimination claim, and the court
held that as of the date of its ruling the claim would be potentially viable
under either theory. For purposes of the qualified immunity determination,
the relevant time period for considering the claim was 1988, shortly after
Bowers was decided. The defendants argued that in light of Bowers, a
school official in 1988 could believe that denying equal treatment to gay
students did not raise any constitutional issue.
The Seventh Circuit panel found that Jamie Nabozny, the plaintiff,
could maintain the equal protection claim in spite of Bowers. The court said
that reliance upon Bowers in this connection was "misplaced," because
Bowers was only about the "criminalization of sodomy," and said that the
defendants could not rely on Bowers' "rational basis analysis" for their
immunity claim because they had not cited "sodomy" or any other "rational
basis" for their conduct, their contention on the motion to dismiss being
that they had not engaged in any discrimination at all.82 The court observed
that it was established as long ago as the 19th century that unequal treatment
against members of minority groups without reason, or completely arbi-
trary discrimination, violates the guarantee of equal protection of the
laws. 83
80. Id. at 635.
81. 92 F.3d 446 (7th Cir. 1996). The Nabozny ruling was issued just two months after the opinion
in Romer was announced. In subsequent litigation, Nabozny won a trial verdict on the issue of liability
and the defendants settled the case for monetary damages of nearly $I million.
82. 92 F.3d at 458.
83. The court observed:
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Thus, in the absence of any asserted justification for treating harass-
ment of a gay student or a male student differently from harassment of a
non-gay or female student, the school officials could not claim qualified
immunity because, in the view of the Seventh Circuit panel, the question in
Nabozny's claim of sexual orientation discrimination was not whether gay
people could be considered a "protected class," but rather whether any
justification could be imagined by the court for treating gay people un-
equally with respect to the issues at stake in the case. 84
The court conceded, however, that Romer would have made this out-
come easier to reach, saying that it "bolsters" the court's analysis "to some
extent."'85 Perhaps more significantly, however, the court stated, "Of course
Bowers will soon be eclipsed in the area of equal protection by the Su-
preme Court's holding in Romer.'" 86 Simply put, a Supreme Court holding
that the Equal Protection Clause invalidated a state policy that discrimi-
nated based on sexual orientation would preclude a court from automati-
cally dismissing a gay person's Equal Protection claim, as Romer must
stand for the proposition, at the very least, that a state actor must have a
reason other than animus or moral disapproval for discriminating based on
sexual orientation. The question that Romer leaves open is whether apply-
ing the Court's "conventional analysis," sexual orientation might be found
to be a suspect or quasi-suspect classification, requiring a higher level of
justification for the state to sustain its policy against constitutional attack.
The Seventh Circuit's suggestion that Romer would soon eclipse Bow-
ers as an Equal Protection precedent was not completely fulfilled, however.
As noted above, some of the circuit courts read Romer as having done what
it had not done: a "conventional" equal protection analysis leading to the
conclusion that government actions discriminating based on sexual orienta-
tion were subject only to rationality review because sexual orientation was
not a suspect or quasi-suspect classification. And, having so read Romer,
As early as 1886 the Supreme Court held that if the law 'is applied and administered by pub-
lic authority with an evil eye and an unequal hand, so as practically to make unjust and illegal
discriminations between persons in similar circumstances, material to their rights, the denial
of equal justice is still within the prohibition of the Constitution.'
Id. (quoting Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373-74 (1886)).
84. 92 F.3d at 458. Indeed, the court indicated that for purposes of deciding the motion to dismiss
on grounds of qualified immunity, it did not have to determine the suspect or quasi-suspect classifica-
tion issue, since the defendants' position was that they had not discriminated based on sexual orienta-
tion. The court noted that the circuit had previously used rational basis review in Ben-Shalom and said
that the rational basis standard was "sufficient" for purposes of deciding this motion. Id.. And, one
could hardly imagine that the school officials could articulate a reason why it is appropriate to allow
male students to sexually harass other male students, while forbidding them from harassing female
students, which was the essence of the case.
85. Id.at458n.12.
86. Id.
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these courts treated the question as having been decided and, in some cases,
seemed to have forgotten the most basic lesson of Romer: that anti-gay
discrimination violates the Constitution if the actor does not have a non-
discriminatory, non-animus-based rational justification for his or her ac-
tions.
The Sixth Circuit's reactions to Romer were difficult to categorize, as
different panels seemed to strike out in different directions. In Stemler v.
City of Florence, the circuit court dealt with a woman's claim that police
officers violated her Equal Protection rights through selective enforcement
of traffic laws, arresting her based on an inaccurate statement by another
person that she was a lesbian who was attempting to abduct the informant's
girlfriend. 87 The events happened before Romer was decided, but the court
determined that the situation involved arbitrary application of a neutral law,
and thus did not implicate the question of what level of scrutiny to apply if
it were determined that the plaintiff was arrested due to her perceived sex-
ual orientation, since her sexual orientation had nothing to do with the law
under which she was charged. 88 A qualified immunity defense could not be
raised because it was well-established that arbitrary enforcement of neutral
laws violates the Equal Protection Clause, 89 and police officers involved
with the arrest had placed great emphasis in their comments to each other at
the scene of a traffic stop on their belief that Stemler was a lesbian, pre-
sumably to lend credence to the informant's false claim that she was ab-
ducting his girlfriend. 90 Stemler was later acquitted by a jury of drunken
driving charges when it appeared that the physical evidence against her was
fabricated and that a key police report document was likely forged.
The police officers in Stemler claimed qualified immunity from any
constitutional liability, relying on Bowers for the proposition that arbitrary
treatment of gay people by the police raises no constitutional issue. After
observing that Bowers was a due process, not an equal protection, case, the
court stated, "It is inconceivable that Bowers stands for the proposition that
the state may discriminate against individuals on the basis of their sexual
orientation solely out of animus to that orientation," and cited Romer, even
though its decision post-dated the arrest at issue.91 The court insisted that
87. 126 F.3d 856 (6th Cir. 1997).
88. Id. at 870.
89. Id. at 867.
90. The court found that "the record evidence could support a finding, that the defendant officers
chose to arrest and prosecute her for driving under the influence because they perceived her to be a
lesbian." Id. at 873. The full story of the case is rather complicated, and the reader should look to the
court's opinion for the bloody details since they would just be a distraction here from the point for
which the case is being discussed.
91. Id.
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Stemler's actual or perceived sexual orientation was irrelevant to the con-
stitutional analysis, so long as the action taken against her was arbitrary.
"[T]he principle would be the same if Stemler had been arrested discrimi-
natorily based on her hair color, her college bumper sticker (perhaps sup-
porting an out-of-state rival) or her affiliation with a disfavored sorority or
company," the court asserted, contending that any government action taken
based on group animus, regardless of the group, was constitutionally objec-
tionable.92 The court disclaimed the need to determine whether sexual ori-
entation is a suspect classification because a "selective enforcement" claim
could be sustained so long as the plaintiff showed that the police officer
acted for reasons not relevant to the offense with which the plaintiff was
charged. The court contended that:
[W]hile almost every statute can be shown to have some conceivable ra-
tional basis, thereby surviving an equal protection challenge unless it is
shown to discriminate against a group accorded heightened scrutiny, it
will often be difficult to find a rational basis for a truly discriminatory
application of a neutral law.93
This final comment may have foreshadowed the circuit's approach in
its pending reconsideration of the Equality Foundation case, which had
been remanded by the Supreme Court for reconsideration in light of Ro-
mer.94 The Cincinnati city charter amendment at issue in that case was
almost identical to Colorado Amendment 2 in its operative wording, and
the arguments that the circuit court had accepted to justify it under rational-
ity review prior to Romer were substantive arguments that the Romer Court
had rejected in connection with Amendment 2, so it was not surprising that
the Supreme Court granted the pending certiorari petition and returned the
case to the Sixth Circuit for reconsideration. However, in a dissent from the
Court's action, Justice Scalia argued that the two provisions presented
sharply different issues because Cincinnati Measure 3 had purely local
effect while Amendment 2 was a statewide enactment. 95 His dissenting
analysis was adopted wholeheartedly by the 6th Circuit in its decision on
remand, once again upholding the Cincinnati measure. The Sixth Circuit's
decision managed to suggest that, despite Romer, Bowers remained the
relevant Supreme Court precedent for deciding this Equal Protection chal-
lenge because, as the Sixth Circuit saw things, sexual orientation was not a
discernable characteristic for Equal Protection analysis, apart from the po-
92. Id. at 874.
93. Id.
94. Equal. Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 128 F.3d 289 (6th Cir. 1997),
on remandfrom 518 U.S. 1001 (1996).
95. 518 U.S. at 1001 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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tentially criminal conduct which defined the class.
The Sixth Circuit panel arrived at its conclusion through willful mis-
representation of the Romer Court's handling of the Equal Protection
analysis. Asserting that the Romer Court had invalidated Amendment 2 by
applying "'rational relationship' strictures to that enactment," the Sixth
Circuit then stated that the Romer Court "resolved that the Colorado state
constitutional provision did not invade any fundamental right and did not
target any suspect class or quasi-suspect class."' 96 Of course, as shown
above, the Romer Court did nothing of the sort, having refrained from en-
gaging in "conventional analysis" of the Equal Protection claim because of
its conclusion that Amendment 2 was an animus-based enactment that
could not be sustained under any version of Equal Protection.
The Sixth Circuit went on to state:
In so ruling, the Court, inter alia, (1) reconfirmed the traditional tripartite
equal protection assessment of legislative measures; and (2) resolved that
the deferential "rational relationship" test, that declared the constitutional
validity of a statute or ordinance if it rationally furthered any conceivable
valid public interest, was the correct point of departure for the evaluation
of laws which uniquely burdened the interests of homosexuals. 97
The Romer Court did neither of these things. It mentioned the "conven-
tional" analysis in passing, but did not state any position on whether or how
it would apply in a conventional gay rights case, and certainly did not make
any assertions about the "rational relationship test" being the "correct point
of departure for the evaluation of laws which uniquely burdened the inter-
ests of homosexuals." The Romer Court refrained from making any overt
comment about how anything other than Amendment 2 should be analyzed
for Equal Protection purposes.
The most frequently litigated question invoking Equal Protection for
gay plaintiffs in federal courts during the 1990s was whether the policy that
Congress adopted for the Armed Forces in 1993, the so-called "don't ask,
don't tell" policy, violated the right of service members to Equal Protection
under the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause. There was considerable
controversy about whether this policy was based on sexual orientation, as
such, or on conduct. If, as the government argued in numerous cases de-
fending the policy, it was based solely on conduct of a type that the Armed
Forces had a right to prohibit by virtue of Bowers, it was hard to see how a
viable Equal Protection claim could be raised. However, there was a plau-
sible argument that the policy was not solely based on conduct, because a
96. 128 F.3d at 294.
97. Id. (footnote ommited).
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service member could avoid adverse consequences by showing that even
though he or she had engaged in prohibited conduct, the conduct was not
consistent with their heterosexual orientation and was due to unusual cir-
cumstances, usually intoxication. Interestingly, given the government's
emphasis on conduct in defending the policy, Bowers was not invariably
expressly invoked by the courts in rejecting challenges to the policy, al-
though they frequently invoked earlier court of appeals decisions which
had, in turn, explicitly relied upon Bowers. Discussion of the military cases
is complicated by the policy of judicial deference to Congress and the mili-
tary on personnel matters, a policy that courts frequently invoked in sup-
port of their conclusion that there should be no heightened scrutiny of
military policies.
The two most prominent pre-Romer challenges to the "don't ask, don't
tell" military policy that was enacted by Congress in 1993 were brought by
individuals, Navy Lieutenant Paul Thomasson and Air Force Captain Rich-
ard Richenberg. In both cases, the service member was processed for dis-
charge under the then-new policy after stating that they were gay, without
any evidence that they had engaged in conduct that violated the military
sodomy law. 98 Ruling on their Equal Protection claims, the Fourth and
Eighth Circuits rejected arguments for heightened scrutiny. The Fourth
Circuit Thomasson court never mentioned Bowers, citing Steffan, which
concerned an earlier "mandatory discharge" version of the policy, as its
authority for the proposition that discrimination against a class composed
of persons defined by homosexual acts did not merit heightened scrutiny,
but clearly relying on Bowers' determination that homosexual conduct did
not enjoy constitutional protection. 99 The Eighth Circuit Richenberg court
98. Under the policy, individuals who state that they are gay will be presumed at least to have a
propensity to engage in homosexual conduct, even in the absence of evidence that they have done so,
and the burden is placed upon the individuals to show that they do not have such a propensity if they
wish to remain in the service. Thomasson refused to discuss his sexual conduct, stating that nobody had
charged him with sexual misconduct and he did not intend to "degrad[e]" himself by discussing the
subject. Thomasson v. Perry, 80 F.3d 915, 921 (4th Cir. 1996). The opinion in Richenberg does not
reflect a similar refusal, but merely that Richenberg was discharged based solely on the statement he
was gay, as he had provided no evidence to rebut the presumption about his sexual propensities.
Richenberg v. Perry, 97 F.3d 256, 260 (8th Cir. 1996).
99. 80 F.3d at 929. The court stated:
The statutory classification here is not suspect, nor does it burden any fundamental right. Sec-
tion 654(b) is aimed at service members who engage in or have a propensity to engage in ho-
mosexual acts. A class comprised of service members who engage in or have a propensity or
intent to engage in such acts is not inherently suspect. See Steffan, 41 F.3d at 684 n.3 (classi-
fication comprised of persons who engage in acts that the military can legitimately proscribe
is not suspect). Similarly, there is no fundamental constitutional right on the part of a service
member to engage in homosexual acts and there is a legitimate military interest in preventing
the same. Heightened scrutiny of this statute would involve the judiciary in an inventive con-
stitutional enterprise, and it would frustrate the elected branches of government in their efforts
to deal with this question. Rational basis is accordingly the suitable standard of review.
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denied heightened scrutiny, citing the Thomasson opinion with approval
and citing prior decisions that had explicitly relied on Bowers in rejecting
the claim that sexual orientation is a suspect classification. 100
The Second Circuit's decision in Able v. United Statesl0 was the ma-
jor post-Romer challenge to the military policy during the period prior to
Lawrence. Able was a test case assembled by LGBT public interest litiga-
tion groups in the belief that Romer would lead to a new receptivity by the
federal courts to gay Equal Protection claims, and that the "don't ask, don't
tell" military policy was also vulnerable to a First Amendment challenge by
making statements an explicit basis for discharge. However, the plaintiffs
did not argue that the policy should be subjected to heightened scrutiny.
Rather, they contended that, as in Romer, the policy was based on animus
and stereotyping, and thus "irrational" and not necessary to achieve the
"unit cohesion" and "order" that Congress had identified in the statute as its
goals for enacting the policy. 102
A federal district judge agreed with the plaintiffs as to the irrationality
of the policy, while observing in dicta that a traditional doctrinal analysis of
the question should lead to heightened scrutiny for government policies
that discriminate based on sexual orientation. 103 However, the court of
appeals had already held at a previous stage in the case that the policy fo-
cused on conduct rather than status. 104 Rather than get into an argument
about whether heightened scrutiny would be appropriate, the appeals court
instead focused most of its opinion on the deference that courts must give
to military policy judgments in constitutional cases. "[W]hile we are not
free to disregard the Constitution in the military context, we owe great
deference to Congress in military matters," the court wrote, continuing,
"[a]lthough deference does not equate to abdication of our constitutional
role in considering whether there is substance to the government's justifica-
tion for its action, courts are ill-suited to second-guess military judgments
Id. at 928.
100. "Richenberg argues that we should apply heightened scrutiny because homosexuality is a
suspect classification. We reject this contention for the reasons stated by the Fourth Circuit in Thomas-
son." 97 F.3d at 260 (citation omitted).
101. 155 F.3d 628 (2d Cir. 1998).
102. See 10 U.S.C. § 654(a)(6) (1994).
103. 155 F.3d at 634.
104. See Able v. United States, 88 F.3d 1280, 1297-99 (2d Cir. 1996). In defending the policy, the
government has consistently argued that the intent of the policy is to exclude from the military anybody
with a "propensity" to engage in "homosexual conduct," thus making the policy conduct-based rather
than status-based. The proviso that a person who can demonstrate that the homosexual conduct in which
they actually engaged did not truly reflect their heterosexual sexual orientation undermines this argu-
ment, because it suggests that ultimately only persons with a particular sexual orientation were subject
to discharge, regardless of their actual conduct.
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that bear upon military capability or readiness."' 105 The court arguably ab-
dicated its role of providing meaningful judicial review, however, by ac-
cepting at face value the assertions by military officials in the hearings that
led to enactment of the policy that it was necessary to dismiss known ho-
mosexuals in order to preserve unit cohesion and good order, or at least by
finding it "rational" for members of Congress to have done so, without
asking whether there was any objective basis for such statements or putting
any burden on the government to provide one. The court apparently saw
this bland acceptance of assertions in the legislative history as consistent
with a traditional rational basis approach combined with the heightened
deference for congressional and military judgments in policy matters that
Supreme Court precedent commanded.
Even though Romer (and Palmore v. Sidoti,106 a much earlier case
supporting the contention that animus-based legislation is constitutionally
suspect) suggests that where animus may be at play the courts should not
uncritically accept the government's articulated reason for a policy, this
court was willing to do so in the name of deference to Congressional and
military judgment when it perceived that national defense was at issue.
Courts deciding equal protection cases in a civilian context were not so
constrained. In Quinn v. Nassau County Police Department,107 for exam-
ple, a trial court in the Second Circuit pointed out that the military cases
turn on the courts' judgment that the military environment differs from a
civilian context, not on a view that gay people are not in general entitled to
protection against governmental discrimination under the Equal Protection
Clause. The Quinn court pointedly noted that "these Courts recognized that
government action in a civil rather than a military setting cannot survive a
rational basis review when it is motivated by irrational fear and prejudice
towards homosexuals." 108 As in many other cases, the defendant in Quinn
did not assert that discrimination against gay people was lawful but rather
took the position that it had not discriminated. Thus, as the defendant had
not articulated any justification for discrimination and the court could not
imagine any constitutionally acceptable justification, the plaintiff won be-
cause the preponderance of the evidence supported his claim of discrimina-
tion.
In a case decided shortly before the Supreme Court's decision in Law-
105. 155 F.3d at 634 (citations omitted).
106. 466 U.S. 429 (1984).
107. 53 F. Supp. 2d 347 (E.D.N.Y. 1999).
108. Id. at 357.
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rence, Flores v. Morgan Hill Unified School District,109 a Ninth Circuit
panel relied upon High Tech Gays yet again for the proposition that "ho-
mosexuals are not a suspect or quasi-suspect class," but did not character-
ize High Tech Gays as using "active rational basis" review for gay
discrimination claims, instead describing the circuit precedent as holding
that homosexuals "are a definable group entitled to rational basis scrutiny
for Equal Protection purposes."110 This was enough, however, to reject a
qualified immunity claim by school administrators who were charged with
failing to accord gay students the same protection against categorical har-
assment that the school district provided for other groups of students. The
defendants did not offer any justification for such disparate treatment, in-
stead arguing (futilely, in light of the plaintiffs' factual allegations) that
they had provided equal treatment to gay students and, thus, their motion
for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds was rejected.
III. LAWRENCE V. TEXAS AND BEYOND
On June 26, 2003, the Supreme Court explicitly overruled Bowers v.
Hardwick in Lawrence v. Texas, stating that "Bowers was not correct when
it was decided, and it is not correct today. It ought not to remain binding
precedent. Bowers v. Hardwick should be and is now overruled." I l l How-
ever, the Court's decision was not ideally articulate in making clear
whether it was overruling Bowers' determination that the action of engag-
ing in homosexual sodomy did not involve the exercise of a fundamental
right of sexual privacy, coextensive with the privacy right that had been
developed in the contraception/abortion line of cases, or rather whether it
was overruling Bowers' assertion that the assumed legislative moral disap-
proval of homosexual conduct could provide a rational basis for sustaining
a criminal statute that did not implicate a fundamental right. This uncer-
tainty was compounded by the Court's failure to make explicitly clear
whether it was applying some form of heightened or strict scrutiny to the
challenged Texas statute. Instead, after reciting the narrow factual setting
for this case-private consensual non-commercial adult homosexual con-
duct-the Court stated its holding with a rhetorical flourish not grounded in
the kind of doctrinal language used in some of its earlier Due Process or
Equal Protection cases:
The petitioners are entitled to respect for their private lives. The State
cannot demean their existence or control their destiny by making their
109. 324 F.3d 1130 (9th Cir. 2003).
110. Id. at 1137.
111. 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
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private sexual conduct a crime. Their right to liberty under the Due Proc-
ess Clause gives them the full right to engage in their conduct without in-
tervention of the government. "It is a promise of the Constitution that
there is a realm of personal liberty which the government may not enter."
Casey, [] at 847, 112 S.Ct. 2791. The Texas statute furthers no legitimate
state interest which can justify its intrusion into the personal and private
life of the individual.112
The first sentence above seems borrowed from European Human
Rights Law, as the European Convention on Human Rights specifically
provides that individuals are entitled to respect for their private life,1 13 a
phrase not characteristic of American constitutional law. The next two
sentences are conclusions presented without direct justificatory argument
or explicit reference to the doctrinal question of the appropriate level of
judicial scrutiny. The quote from Casey is a broadly general assertion of
principle, once again bereft of any reference to the level of scrutiny issue.
And the final sentence, upon which subsequent lower court rulings were to
place great weight in their conclusion that this was a "rational basis" hold-
ing, merely states that in the balance between the individual's interest and
the state's interest, the state has presented no legitimate interest to place on
the scales. In that sense, the final sentence evokes such prior lower court
decisions as Quinn or Nabozny, where the courts noted that the state had
articulated no justification for treating gay people worse than others, as it
was the state's position, belied in those cases by the evidence, that the state
was not treating gay people worse than others. 114 Significantly, this final
sentence of the paragraph clearly implies that the one justification actually
advanced by the state in its briefs and oral argument-the Texas legisla-
112. Id. The citation to Casey is no real help in clarifying the matter because that decision poses
similar problems of doctrinal clarity, leaving unanswered the question whether a pregnant woman has a
fundamental right to terminate her pregnancy, rather speaking in terms of a liberty interest subject to
varying degrees of regulation at various times during the process of pregnancy.
113. Article 8 of the European Convention provides:
(1) Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his corre-
spondence.
(2) There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except
such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests
of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the preven-
tion of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the
rights and freedoms of others.
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, as amended by Protocol
No. 11, Council of Europe, Nov. 4, 1950, 312 E.T.S. 155.
114. The state actually attempted to make the same argument in Lawrence, contending that the
statute penalized acts, not status, and therefore did not discriminate based on sexual orientation because
two heterosexuals of the same sex would violate the statute if they engaged in anal or oral sex. Justice
O'Connor's concurrence refuted this argument by observing that the conduct at issue "is closely corre-
lated with being homosexual," 539 U.S. at 583 (O'Connor, J., concurring), and in the Court's opinion,
Justice Kennedy described the conduct at issue as "sexual practices common to a homosexual lifestyle."
Id. at 578.
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ture's moral disapproval of homosexual sodomy-was not "legitimate." 115
Thus, the Court's actual statement of its holding took no explicit posi-
tion about whether the defendants were asserting a fundamental right.
Rather, it ruled that in the absence of any legitimate justification, the state's
criminal statute could not be applied to the conduct charged against the
defendants. This was not necessarily a ruling that the statute was facially
unconstitutional, or unconstitutional in all its potential applications, since
the statute, as written, applied broadly to all instances of same-sex anal or
oral intercourse, whether in private or public, whether consensual or co-
erced, whether involving payment or not, whether involving minors or only
adults, and the Court expressly disclaimed ruling on its application in any
context other than that presented by the plaintiffs. In light of the overall
tone and rhetoric of the opinion, one might even conclude that the Court
was only rejecting the application of the statute in cases involving a roman-
tic relationship, although one might construe the text to extend to a "one-
night stand" that had the potential to blossom into something deeper in
terms of personal commitment.
These ambiguities made it possible for Justice Scalia to assert in his
dissent that, in fact, the Court had not really overruled Bowers in its en-
tirety, just those aspects of Bowers directly relevant to sustaining the appli-
cation of Georgia's criminal law to "homosexuals" who were engaging in
"sodomy," to use Justice White's idiosyncratic formulation of the issue in
Bowers. 116
The Court had granted certiorari on the question whether the Texas
Homosexual Conduct Law violated the defendants' right to Equal Protec-
tion, but the Court decided not to answer that question. Justice Kennedy
wrote that although an Equal Protection argument was "tenable," the Court
preferred to decide the case by overruling Bowers, because Bowers' con-
tinued existence as a precedent "is an invitation to subject homosexual
persons to discrimination both in the public and in the private spheres." 117
Kennedy did not cite any cases for this point, but the opinion might be read
as referring to the pre-Lawrence Equal Protection case law relying on Bow-
ers to reject gay Equal Protection claims. This suggests that invalidation of
115. Interestingly, the state asserted that it was not treating gay people differently than others,
because heterosexuals were also prohibited from engaging in same-sex sodomy. Justice O'Connor took
on and demolished this argument in her concurring opinion. Id. at 583 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
116. Id. at 586 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Scalia characterized the final sentence of the Court's holding
this way after quoting it: "overruling Bowers to the extent it sustained Georgia's antisodomy statute
under the rational basis test." Id. Then he observes that the Court does not declare that "homosexual
sodomy" is a "fundamental right" under the Due Process Clause. Id.
117. Id. at 574-75 (majority opinion).
[Vol 84:2
EXORCISING THE GHOSTS OF BOWERS V. HARDWICK
Texas' Homosexual Conduct Law using the Due Process Clause was in-
tended by the Court to signal that discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation, if premised on moral disapproval of homosexual conduct, was
similarly unconstitutional. Regardless of the state's argument, noted above,
that the law targeted conduct rather than status and thus did not discrimi-
nate on its face based on the sexual orientation of the participants, it had
been conceded at oral argument in Bowers in 1986 that any attempt to en-
force the sodomy law against consensual private sodomy involving hetero-
sexuals would violate the right of sexual privacy that the Court had been
constructing in its reproductive rights cases leading up to that decision, as
Justice Stevens noted in his Bowers dissent. 118 Thus, Justice Kennedy's
assertion that holding the law unconstitutional under the Due Process
Clause would also "advance" the case against sexual orientation discrimi-
nation is significant for subsequent Equal Protection analysis. Indeed, Ken-
nedy's approach at least implies that Due Process and Equal Protection are
merely two sides of the same coin, an implication confirmed by the Court's
Fifth Amendment Due Process jurisprudence, holding, essentially, that
equal protection of the law is an integral component of substantive due
process, thus subjecting the federal government to the identical equal pro-
tection requirement that applies to the states explicitly through the Four-
teenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause.1 19
A practical application of this idea later emerged in two federal Court
of Appeals opinions dealing with constitutional challenges to the "don't
ask, don't tell" policy. Under the policy, gay people can serve in the mili-
tary so long as they refrain from doing or saying anything that might lead
anybody to realize that they are gay, and potential recruits are not asked to
disclose their sexual orientation. 120 However, the policy imputes to gay
people a propensity to engage in "homosexual conduct," so if they do or
say anything that would give rise to the inference that they are gay, they are
subject to discharge unless they can prove that they lack such a propensity.
One of the pillars supporting this policy is Article 125 of the Uniform Code
of Military Justice, which makes sodomy illegal in the military, regardless
of the sex of the participants. 121 Another is the implication from the find-
118. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 217-18 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
119. Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) (holding that although the Fourteenth Amendment
Equal Protection Clause does not bind the government of the District of Columbia, that government is
nonetheless bound by the obligation of equal protection of the laws by virtue of the Due Process Clause
of the Fifth Amendment); see also United States v. Sperry Corp., 493 U.S. 52 (1989); Immigration &
Naturalization Serv. v. Pangilinan, 486 U.S. 875 (1988); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 638
n.2 (1975).
120. 10 U.S.C. § 654 (2006).
121. Article 125 provides:
2009]
CHICAGO-KENT LA WREVIEW
ings section of the enacting statute, that homosexuality is incompatible with
military service, not because gay people are not capable of performing the
tasks required of military personnel, but because their presence is seen as
endangering morale and good order due to the presumed fears and preju-
dices of non-gay personnel subjected to their presence. 122 Every pre-
Lawrence attempt to challenge this policy using Equal Protection argu-
ments has ultimately foundered on the conclusions that sexual orientation is
not a suspect classification and that the rational basis test is easily satisfied
by the testimony of military commanders during the congressional hearings
in 1993 that the policy is necessary for military operations, and, of course,
on the problem that the policy focused on individuals deemed to have a
propensity to engage in conduct that violates military penal law.
Challengers to the policy have also argued that it violates the Due
Process Clause because it burdens the privacy rights of gay service mem-
bers by subjecting them to expulsion based on their sexual identity and
engagement in private, consensual sexual activity. Prior to Lawrence, this
argument could not make any headway because of Bowers. If the conduct
at issue was subject to criminal penalties under the UCMJ, it was difficult
to argue that persons with a "propensity" to engage in such conduct could
claim constitutional protection against the military personnel policy on Due
Process grounds. Once Bowers had been overruled, however, courts had to
confront the loss of a major pillar supporting the policy, and the continued
validity of Article 125 of the UCMJ was called into question.
The specialized appellate courts concerned with military justice re-
sponded to this new state of affairs by acknowledging that Lawrence re-
quired a de facto revision of Article 125 to take account of the liberty
interest identified by the Supreme Court. This required a case by case de-
termination whether Article 125 can be constitutionally applied to a par-
ticular set of facts. This revisionist interpretation is articulated in a 2004
ruling by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces, United States v.
Marcum,123 an appeal of a court martial conviction that included a count
for "non-forcible sodomy." Article 125, as noted above, on its face forbids
all acts of sodomy by military personnel. In this case, the appellant, a male
(a) Any person subject to this chapter who engages in unnatural carnal copulation with an-
other person of the same or opposite sex or with an animal is guilty of sodomy. Penetration,
however slight, is sufficient to complete the offense.
(b) Any person found guilty of sodomy shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.
Id. § 925.
122. Id. § 654(a)(15) ("The presence in the armed forces of persons who demonstrate a propensity
or intent to engage in homosexual acts would create an unacceptable risk to the high standards of
morale, good order and discipline, and unit cohesion that are the essence of military capability.").
123. 60 M.J. 198 (C.A.A.F. 2004).
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technical sergeant serving in a supervisory capacity, had been convicted of
private non-forcible same-sex sodomy with a lower-ranking adult service
member in his chain of command. He argued that this private consensual
conduct should be held protected under Lawrence, thus invalidating the
application of Article 125 to his case.
The court set out a middle ground between the contending views about
whether Lawrence was a fundamental rights case or a rational basis case.
Focusing on the Supreme Court's recital in its key paragraph of the precise
factual scenario that it was addressing, the Marcum court treated Lawrence
as an "as applied" holding, concluding that there was no need to rule on the
facial validity or invalidity of Article 125. Instead, the court said:
What Lawrence requires is searching constitutional inquiry. This inquiry
may require a court to go beyond a determination as to whether the activ-
ity at issue falls within column A-conduct of a nature to bring it within
the liberty interest identified in Lawrence, or within column B-factors
identified by the Supreme Court as outside its Lawrence analysis. The
Court's analysis reached beyond the immediate facts of the case pre-
sented. This is reflected by the Court's decision to rule on the grounds of
due process as opposed to equal protection. "Were we to hold the statute
invalid under the Equal Protection Clause," the Supreme Court noted,
"some might question whether a prohibition would be valid if drawn dif-
ferently, say, to prohibit the conduct both between same-sex and differ-
ent-sex participants."1 24
The Marcum court examined the particular circumstances presented
by a military environment and the appellant's place in that environment and
in relation to the service member with whom he engaged in sex. Due to the
differences in their rank, and the appellant's supervisory authority over his
sexual partner, there were "special circumstances" to figure into the analy-
sis that derived from the Supreme Court's itemization of the factual ele-
ments that were not present in the Lawrence case. Most significantly, the
supervisory status creates a doubt whether true consent could be found, due
to the influence the appellant would have over the life and career of his
subordinate. Additionally, a sexual relationship could lead to suspicion of
favoritism towards the sexual partner in command decisions, undermining
the chain of command and the professional detachment that a superior offi-
cer should have toward his subordinates. In other words, in the context of
the hierarchical military structure, there were good reasons to seek to deter
officers from having sex-whether sodomy or any other form of sexual
activity-with the service members under their command. And it was on
that basis that the Marcum court found that the appellant's conduct was not
124. Id. at 205 (citing Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 575(2003)).
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protected by Lawrence.
What is most important about this analysis from the point of view of
the "don't ask, don't tell" policy and its logical reliance on Article 125 for
its justification, is that it undermines the argument that all those having a
"propensity" to engage in homosexual conduct must be separated from the
service, because such "propensity" might be channeled into sexual conduct
that would invoke none of the reasons to find Lawrence inapplicable as
articulated by the Marcum court. If the service member engages in consen-
sual sodomy with a civilian, in a private location far from the military base,
at a time when the service member is off duty, none of the specific con-
cerns arising from a military environment are implicated. Thus, the policy
is shown to be overly broad, going further than required to preserve the
interests identified by Congress when it was enacted, and significantly
burdening the liberty interest of individual service members.
So held a panel of the Ninth Circuit in Witt v. Department. of Air
Force,125 as the facts presented by plaintiff Margaret Witt challenging her
discharge exactly fit the pattern articulated above. She alleged that she had
conducted a discrete homosexual relationship with a civilian woman in the
privacy of a residence hundreds of miles away from the military facility
where she worked, and had never spoken about her homosexuality to any-
body on the base or in the military, even when she was contacted and con-
fronted with allegations that she was carrying on a homosexual
relationship, to which she refused to respond. She never "told," but she was
discharged based on the military's conclusion that the allegations it had
received about her being a lesbian who had a relationship with another
woman were true, as they were. The federal district court dismissed her
complaint, ruling she had failed to state a valid constitutional claim, relying
upon pre-Lawrence Ninth Circuit decisions upholding the validity of the
military policy. 126
Witt argued on appeal that the prior Ninth Circuit rulings, each of
which had evaluated the constitutionality of the military policy using the
rational basis test, were effectively overruled by Lawrence, because, ac-
cording to her argument, Lawrence had recognized a fundamental right for
homosexuals to engage in sodomy, and the military policy unjustifiably
burdened that right. The Ninth Circuit panel was not willing to go quite so
125. 527 F.3d 806 (9th Cir. 2008).
126. Holmes v. Cal. Army Nat'l Guard, 124 F.3d 1126, 1136 (9th Cir.1997) (rejecting an Equal
Protection Clause challenge to DADT under rational basis review); Philips v. Perry, 106 F.3d 1420,
1425-26 (9th Cir. 1997) (same); Beller v. Middendorf, 632 F.2d 788, 805-12 (9th Cir. 1980) (rejecting
procedural due process and substantive due process challenges to a Navy regulation forbidding homo-
sexual service in the Navy).
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far. Having determined that the Lawrence opinion was "ambiguous" on the
appropriate level of review, the court said that "we analyze Lawrence by
considering what the Court actually did, rather than by dissecting isolated
pieces of text. In so doing, we conclude that the Supreme Court applied a
heightened level of scrutiny in Lawrence."127
The court supported this conclusion by arguing first that the result in
Lawrence was inconsistent with rational basis review, and the overruling of
Bowers signaled that Bowers had either inappropriately used that level of
scrutiny or incorrectly applied it. In selecting between these two possibili-
ties, the Witt court opted for the former, seizing upon Justice Kennedy's
observation that the Bowers court had failed to "appreciate the extent of the
liberty interest that was at stake."' 128 By holding that the conduct at issue
fell within the sphere of the liberty interest that had been staked out in prior
sexual privacy cases, the Lawrence court had taken a route that was "incon-
sistent with rational basis review." 129 Further, argued the Witt court, citing
in support of its decision prior cases that had all used at least heightened
scrutiny, the Lawrence court was indicating that heightened scrutiny was
the correct methodology to evaluate laws burdening private, consensual
homosexual conduct. Finally, the last sentence of the Lawrence court's
holding spoke of the failure of the state to "justify" its intrusion into the
liberty of the petitioner, which was also inconsistent with rational basis
review, because the state bears no burden of justification in a rational basis
case, where the Court has placed the burden on the challenger to show that
there is no rational justification for the statute.
However, the Witt court, noting that because Lawrence had not used
the strict scrutiny vocabulary of "narrow tailoring" or "compelling state
interest," took the position that this was not a fundamental rights case. It
looked for guidance to an appropriate method of judicial review at Sell v.
United States,130 a case decided shortly before Lawrence. In Sell, the Court
confronted a due process challenge to the practice of forcible administra-
tion of anti-psychotic drugs to criminal defendants in order to render them
competent to stand trial. The Witt court found to be "instructive" the Sell
Court's use of a methodology intermediate between strict scrutiny and ra-
tional basis. The Sell Court found the petitioner's liberty interest to be "sig-
nificant," the state's interest to be "legitimate" and "important," and held
that under the circumstances it was up to the state to "justify" its "intrusion
127. 527 F.3d at 816.
128. Id. at 817 (quoting Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567).
129. 527 F.3d at 817.
130. 539 U.S. 166 (2003).
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into the individual's recognized liberty interest."' 131 The parallelism with
the Court's terminology in Lawrence suggested a similar approach in Witt,
where the plaintiff's liberty interest is at least "significant."
The key step in the analysis, of course, is to place the burden on the
government to "justify" its intrusion into the individual's liberty interest.
Once that burden has been placed on the government to "justify" its policy,
a court may not simply dismiss a claim plausibly invoking that liberty in-
terest. The Sell court identified several specific factors for analysis in carry-
ing out this balance of interests, three of which struck the Witt court as
relevant to the challenge to the military policy:
We hold that when the government attempts to intrude upon the personal
and private lives of homosexuals, in a manner that implicates the rights
identified in Lawrence, the government must advance an important gov-
ernmental interest, the intrusion must significantly further that interest,
and the intrusion must be necessary to further that interest. In other
words, for the third factor, a less intrusive means must be unlikely to
achieve substantially the government's interest.132
Further, the court held that, as in Lawrence itself, the challenge was to
the policy as applied to the facts of the particular case. Just as Lawrence
made clear that it was not considering the application of the Texas statute
to non-consensual or public acts, the Witt court made clear that on remand
the district court should focus on whether the military policy could consti-
tutionally be applied to Major Witt's situation. While acknowledging that
prior Ninth Circuit cases had rejected the idea of case-by-case determina-
tion of the constitutionality of dismissing a particular service member for
homosexuality, the Witt court held case-by-case adjudication to be consis-
tent with the approach that had been taken by the military appeals court in
Marcum, at once acknowledging that Lawrence had some application in the
military context but limiting its protection to cases in which the individ-
ual's conduct must be constrained due to the special circumstances of mili-
tary life. The Witt court acknowledged that on the first factor, the military
did have a significant interest, as identified in the preamble of the statute
enacting "don't ask, don't tell," in maintaining good order and morale, so
the question to be determined on remand was whether the government
could satisfy the other two factors, showing that discharging Major Witt
would advance those goals and was necessary to do so. In a footnote, the
court suggested that under the facts Witt had alleged, it seemed unlikely
that the government could meet that burden. 133
131. Id. at 176-86.
132. Witt, 527 F.3d at 819.
133. Id. at 821 n.l.
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Having found that heightened scrutiny applied to Witt's due process
claim, the court summarily rejected her Equal Protection claim, based on
the observation that Lawrence had declined to address the petitioners'
Equal Protection claim, and thus the Ninth Circuit's prior rulings rejecting
Equal Protection challenges to the military policy had not been affected by
Lawrence.134 This brief paragraph reasserts the formalistic distinction be-
tween due process and equal protection that is completely undermined by
the prior Fifth Amendment Due Process analysis. That is, it seems clear
that the due process and equal protection claims are factually and logically
intertwined, at least when they are raised in the context of a challenge to a
federal government policy where both kinds of claims are derived from the
exact same words in the Constitutional text, the Due Process Clause in the
Fifth Amendment. Since Lawrence was a challenge to a state law arising
under the Fourteenth Amendment, where the text articulates two distinctly
separate clauses for due process and equal protection restrictions on state
action, the Court might naturally treat the two kinds of claims as analyti-
cally distinct. It seems less plausible to do so in a Fifth Amendment
case. 135
Shortly after the Witt ruling, the First Circuit ruled on a facial chal-
lenge to the military policy in a "test case" brought by a group of former
military members, Cook v. Gates.136 The Cook panel essentially agreed
with the Witt court that heightened scrutiny should apply to a challenge to
134. One member of the Ninth Circuit panel argued in partial dissent that in fact Lawrence had
been a fundamental rights case, and that Romer had left open the level of scrutiny to be applied in future
equal protection claims brought by gay litigants, merely holding that Colorado Amendment 2 was
unconstitutional because the Court could imagine no legitimate policy justification for it because it
made a defined group of citizens unequal for the sake of making them unequal. This partially dissenting
judge would have held that strict scrutiny applies to the military policy under both due process and
equal protection theories, having concluded that sexual orientation should be considered a "suspect
classification" using the traditional multi-factorial analysis to determine whether governmental dis-
crimination against a particular group should be subjected to strict scrutiny. Id. at 822-27 (Canby, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
135. Indeed, the Ninth Circuit itself made a similar point in High Tech Gays when it used Bowers
as a precedent to reject an Equal Protection challenge to the Defense Department's security screening
process, observing that it would be anomalous if the same language from the Fifth Amendment that
failed to protect homosexual conduct from criminal prosecution could be pressed into service to strike
down a government policy that discriminates against persons because they engage in homosexual
conduct. The very idea of due process and equal protection being distinct concepts as opposed to an
overarching concept of fundamental fairness is exploded by the reasoning of both High Tech Gays and
Witt.
136. 528 F.3d 42 (1st Cir. 2008). The plaintiffs had purported to bring both an as-applied and facial
challenge, but the district court found the complaint deficient in factual allegations necessary for an as-
applied challenge, and that aspect of the case dropped out. The plaintiffs also asserted a First Amend-
ment claim, asserting that the policy unconstitutionally imposed a penalty on speech, but this was
rejected in line with prior precedents holding that speech was merely the means of discovering the
identity giving rise to a propensity to engage in conduct, so the consequences attached to "telling" were
not due to telling but rather to what the telling had revealed about the speaker.
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the military policy, but concluded, as a matter of law, that the government
had met its burden of justification by reference to the legislative history of
the 1993 statute, which enunciated congressional findings that the policy
was necessary to achieve good order and morale in the military. Unlike the
Witt court, the Cook court devoted extensive discussion to Supreme Court
precedents compelling lower federal courts to extend significant deference
to the fact-finding of Congress in matters of national security. Since this
was a facial test case attack on the statutory policy, rather than an individ-
ual attack on its application in a particular case, the court saw no need for
fact-finding about whether it was necessary to discharge a particular mili-
tary member in order to achieve the goals that Congress had articulated.
The court also noted Witt's reliance on the Sell decision for guidance on
how to apply heightened scrutiny, but questioned its utility in the context of
a military case, commenting, "Although we find Sell instructive in the
sense that it illustrates the Supreme Court's application of an intermediate
level of scrutiny, we do not find Sell especially helpful in analyzing this
statute regulating military affairs."' 37
Turning to the plaintiffs Equal Protection claim, the Cook court as-
serted that Lawrence had not altered the rational basis analysis that the
Cook court attributed to Romer v. Evans. Since the Lawrence Court re-
frained from analyzing the petitioners' Equal Protection claim, the Cook
court asserted that Lawrence could not be argued to have changed the stan-
dard for Equal Protection review.
Thus, twice in 2008 federal circuit courts of appeal had ruled that
Lawrence did not change the equal protection calculus of Romer, and that
Romer had not established a requirement of heightened or strict scrutiny in
Equal Protection claims raised by gay litigants, but both had in essence
recognized Equal Protection-like claims against the federal government
using a due process theory requiring heightened scrutiny of policies that
burdened an individual's liberty interest in homosexual identity and con-
duct. Since federal Equal Protection claims are derived from the Due Proc-
ess Clause of the Fifth Amendment, this was, in effect, a roundabout way
of achieving heightened scrutiny of what is both an equal protection and a
due process claim.
Judge William Canby, dissenting in Witt, argued that Romer had left
open the question of what standard of judicial review courts should employ
in ordinary sexual orientation discrimination cases. He also rejected the
continuing precedential value of earlier Ninth Circuit cases rejecting "sus-
137. ld. at60n.10.
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pect classification" status for sexual orientation, as they derived from High
Tech Gays, which grounded its reasoning in the now-overruled Bowers
decision. Reviewing the factors that the Supreme Court has used to identify
suspect classifications, he concluded without equivocation that sexual ori-
entation should be deemed a suspect classification. He referenced his own
earlier dissenting decisions on this point, which he summarized by assert-
ing:
[H]omosexuals have "experienced a history of purposeful unequal treat-
ment [and] been subjected to unique disabilities on the basis of stereo-
typed characteristics not truly indicative of their abilities., 138. They also
"exhibit obvious, immutable, or distinguishing characteristics that define
them as a discrete group; and they are [ ] a minority."'139 In short, they
are a group deserving of protection against the prejudices and power of
an often-antagonistic majority. 140
However, despite these developments showing a possible recent drift
away from the pre-Lawrence, Bowers-rooted approach to gay Equal Protec-
tion claims, the effect of Bowers lingers on, as evidenced by the quotations
from recent trial court opinions that preface this article, and was evident in
a recent Tenth Circuit ruling on a sexual orientation discrimination claim
by a lesbian who was denied a position as a public school administrator,
arguably because the school superintendent thought that the community
would have moral objections to a lesbian in that position. 14 1 The complicat-
ing factor in the case was that the superintendent's action came a few
weeks before the Supreme Court announced its decision in Lawrence, lead-
ing the court of appeals to conclude that because Bowers had not yet then
been overruled and an old Bowers-rooted Tenth Circuit decision had re-
jected a claim of heightened scrutiny for anti-gay discrimination (ironi-
cally, in another case where an applicant for a school administrator position
was rejected due to a school superintendent's belief that he was gay), 142 the
school superintendent was immune from any liability for violating the
Equal Protection rights of the lesbian applicant. Although the trial court
had concluded that the superintendent's action had violated the plaintiffs
right to equal protection, but the action was barred on grounds of immu-
nity, the Tenth Circuit panel affirmed the immunity ruling but abstained
138. Witt, 527 F.3dat 824-25 (quoting Mass. Bd. ofRet. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976)).
139. 527 F.3d at 825 (quoting Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635, 638 (1986)).
140. 527 F.3d at 825. Judge Canby's analysis was similar to that of the California Supreme Court in
In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 441-42 (Cal. 2008), in which the court found sexual orientation to
be a suspect classification under the California Constitution, in the context of a successful challenge to a
statute that limited the definition of marriage to the union of a man and a woman.
141. Milligan-Hitt v. Bd. of Tr. of Sheridan County Sch. Dist., 523 F.3d 1219 (10th Cir. 2008).
142. Jantz v. Muci, 976 F.2d 623 (10th Cir.1992).
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from pronouncing on the correctness of the trial court's determination that
the action was unconstitutional under post-Lawrence law, since it found
that only pre-Lawrence law was relevant to the trial court's decision. 143
Thus, at least in the Tenth Circuit, it seems that public officials may still
enjoy qualified immunity when they rely on the moral disapproval of the
community to discriminate against gay people.144
CONCLUSION
Although Bowers v. Hardwick was not an Equal Protection case, many
lower federal courts cited and relied on it as authority for holding that
Equal Protection claims by gay litigants were entitled, at best, to rationality
review, and some have dismissed such claims outright on the assertion that
gay people are not a "protected class" for constitutional purposes. Now that
Bowers has been overruled in Lawrence v. Texas, and indeed discredited as
having been wrongly decided in the first instance, it is past time for Equal
Protection rulings by the circuit courts relying on Bowers to be discarded
as precedents, even when they have not been specifically overruled by later
decisions of the same circuit. Although the Supreme Court has not clearly
spoken on the question whether gay Equal Protection claims should invoke
heightened scrutiny by the courts, the combination of the Court's rulings in
Romer v. Evans and Lawrence v. Texas provide the basis for concluding
that the earlier Bowers-rooted opinions are no longer plausible interpreta-
tions of the constitutional rights of gay people to fair treatment by govern-
ment actors. Surely, in the wake of Lawrence, there can be little question
that discrimination on the basis of private homosexual conduct or on the
status of having a homosexual sexual orientation presents at least an ac-
tionable claim under the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments, and the Court's
actual ruling in Romer, as noted in the 2008 military rulings by the First
143. At the time of its opinion, the 10th Circuit's refusal to rule on whether the superintendent's
action was unconstitutional violated the procedure established by the Supreme Court for determining
qualified immunity in Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001). Under Saucier, a court was first to deter-
mine whether the official's action was unconstitutional, and only then, if it was found to be unconstitu-
tional, to decide whether its unconstitutionality was sufficiently established to overcome qualified
immunity. The Court subsequently decided, in Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S.Ct. 808 (2009), that a court
confronting a qualified immunity defense can proceed directly to the question whether the claimed
constitutional right is sufficiently established, without opining on the merits, in effect endorsing the
procedure the 10th Circuit followed in deciding the immunity question in Milligan-Hitt.
144. However, another Tenth Circuit panel subsequently found that when a government defendant
implausibly denies having discriminated, and thus provides no explanation for its actions, the defendant
will not be shielded by qualified immunity from a sexual orientation discrimination claim that is facially
valid, Price-Comelison v Brooks, 524 F.3d 1003 (10th Cir. 2008), so the circuit was taking a position,
consistent with Jantz, that the state must have at least a rational basis for treating gay people differently
from non-gay people, a point not quite understood by some trial judges.
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and Ninth Circuits, can leave little doubt that gay Equal Protection claims
are entitled to at least heightened (if not strict) scrutiny from the courts.

